Russia's open war against Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, Russia’s political elite and its—to this day—unchallenged leader, Vladimir V. Putin, launched a military invasion of neighboring Ukraine. The aggression continues unabated and even threatens to escalate further. Thousands of people have already been killed, including innocent civilians and children. Far more have been injured; infrastructure has been destroyed, and buildings and public spaces have been bombed.

What will happen in Ukraine and on the global political stage in the coming days and weeks—whether the fighting will spread, what resistance the Ukrainian army and emerging volunteer units will be able to mount, whether the ceasefire negotiations can be expected to succeed, or whether mass protests against the war will form in Russia and force Putin’s downfall—no one knows at this time.

What we, as informed citizens and members of the academic community, can and should know, however, is...

... that Putin heads a regime that is democratic in appearance but authoritarian in nature, which, through state propaganda and control of the mass media, bureaucratic and openly violent methods to exercise its rule in the Russian Federation and pursues imperial goals aimed at restoring Great Russian power in the post-Soviet space of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as on the global political stage.

... that the attack on Ukraine was justified with claims of a threat to the Russian population in Ukraine (from “fascists” and “nationalists”) and to Russia from the Ukrainian state, but above all with the claim that NATO poses a security threat to Russia—whereby the first claim is absurd and the second claim—even if it were justified, which is doubtful—has nothing to do with Ukraine and its invasion.

... that Ukraine, like any sovereign state in the world, can and may decide for itself whether or not to apply for membership in a military alliance, whether to commit to neutrality, or whether to conclude mutual assistance treaties with third parties. Russia has absolutely no right to determine this matter or to have a say in the decision. It is irrelevant whether other states have made similar claims or taken similar actions. The wrongdoing of third parties does not legitimize one’s own wrongdoing.

... that in 1994, Russia solemnly guaranteed Ukraine, by treaty and in perpetuity, the inviolability of its borders and its full sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine’s relinquishment of its nuclear weapons (Ukraine possessed over 1,200 nuclear warheads from the arsenals of the Soviet Union, which was dissolved at the end of 1991), a fact that does not concern Putin or the Russian state today.

... that whatever the (geo-)political, economic, cultural, or journalistic slights, disregard, set-asides, or ignorant treatment of Russia and its political elite over the past three decades may have been, whatever formal and informal treaties between Russia and the West may have been violated or broken after the end of the Soviet Union, and whatever threats from “the West” NATO, and the U.S.—none of this can even begin to legitimize a war of aggression against Ukraine (not, for example, against the U.S. or NATO), nor can it even make such a war plausibly justifiable through argumentation. Ukraine is under attack because what is at stake is Ukraine itself—its politics, its sovereignty, and its role as a model for the Russian democracy movement in relation to Russian imperial consciousness and the authoritarian state.

... that this thesis is not merely a hypothesis, but has been a fact—at least since 2005 and, more acutely, since 2014— i.e., the occupation of Crimea and the active support for the breakaway, predominantly Russian-speaking regions (“republics”) of eastern Ukraine, a fact . In this respect, it is hardly comprehensible to speak of a “turning point” brought about by the current war of aggression. If anything, the turning point lies in the brutal openness of the military aggression. In this respect—regardless of whatever other ideas, arguments, supposed evidence, or lines of reasoning Putin and his apparatus may put forward—this war of aggression has an obviously imperial character; in this sense, it is an imperialist war.

...

Since my childhood, I have been immersing myself in Russian culture—and the older I’ve become, the more self-motivated I’ve been to do so—listening to Russian (but also Ukrainian, Belarusian, Kazakh, etc.) music, read Russian literature—from Ivan Turgenev to Valam Shalamov, from Leo Tolstoy to Andrei Bely, from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Mikhail Bulgakov—and grapple with Russian and (post)Soviet history and society. In many ways, Russian (and, more broadly, [post]Soviet) art and culture are closer to me than any other (apart from parts of German culture). At the same time—and presumably also for this very reason—it is and remains a struggle that, alongside closeness, knows distance; alongside understanding, knows alienation, even incomprehension; and alongside longing, also knows flight. ... I am noting this here for only two reasons. First, to show that I am not one of those for whom Russia is distant and unimportant—and who, precisely for that reason, see in this war only one final sign, one last proof of the Russia that has always been “abhorrent,” “Asian,” or “pre-modern” to them. As powerful as history may be, the future—any future—remains open. Second, and immediately following this, I am writing this down so as not to exclude or forget the “other side” of Russia and its people. Russia is not just this war, the annexation of Crimea, the oligarch-driven economy, or Putin and his apparatus of power —it is also the many democrats, civil society activists, independent journalists and scholars, courageous protesters, and those engaged in resistance—in the major cities as well as in medium-sized towns and the vast rural areas. It is these people I am thinking of, and in whom I am placing my hope even now, as we seek to stop the war of aggression within Russia itself. That may not seem likely in the coming days—but who knows. Here, too, the same applies: every act of resistance, every revolution, has something sudden and unpredictable about it. ...

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In their name and in support of them—especially in light of the horrific images of the war in Ukraine and with regard to our university partners in Ukraine, their students, and staff—we, as a democratic university community, are therefore called upon to

• to participate in the protests against this war and against Russia’s imperial claim to dominance (without thereby condemning Russian society and the Russian people as a whole),
• to actively provide aid and solidarity in appropriate ways (ranging from donations to welcoming refugees and, where applicable, offering scholarships or internships for students and scholars from Ukraine, particularly from our partner universities; the university administration has already taken action in consultation with Saxony’s other universities and is planning initiatives),
• to support the examination of the war of aggression and its causes through open, democratic, and academic discourse, and, where appropriate, to help organize relevant forums.

The University Executive Board and I personally are happy to assist all students, staff, and professors with any questions or ideas and suggestions for actions and support services. Please contact me at my usual email address.

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May this war of aggression end as soon as possible, brought to an end by Russia; every day of aggression, fighting, and death is one too many.